How valid is assassination as a tool of governments?

It is no secret that the Middle East is on the brink of collapse, and in many ways has already gone over the edge. As it stands, it is a melting pot of conflicts that have increasingly disrupted the capacity of the region to formulate even a semblance of stability. That these conflicts are instigated by particular individuals, through some sort of ideological or militaristic leadership, is in very little dispute. The manner with which a nation is to deal with the individuals who would wilfully harm it’s people, and those of the wider world, therefore becomes problematic. How does a nation protect itself from the threat of an individual who uses tools at their disposal to incite harm and violence? The idea that diplomacy is an option, becomes increasingly less valid considering the extent to which these individuals go to fulfil their ideological dribble- traversing countries, spending millions of dollars and assembling armies to do their bidding. These are individuals who have no interest in diplomatic relations, and moreover are prepared for the consequences of a war. It is therefore necessary to provide an intermediary step – one which avoids the potential damages of war and one which transcends the boundaries that exist in diplomatic negotiations. In recognition of this fact, it would seem that assassination presents itself as a legitimate solution – not only because it avoids a full-scale war, but also because it targets those particular individuals who, without their leadership, such conflicts would never have existed.

However, it would be problematic to place such vague and large parameters on the use of assassination, particularly because it could vindicate the use of it for more heinous reasons. In that event, what must be considered is the use of assassination. At this point in time, it is fair to say that Al Qaeda has been demonstrably weakened by the effects of Osama Bin Laden’s killing; the Yemeni branch has been cut off because the ideological and ethnical links which had once existed through the “inspirational” leadership of Osama Bin Laden is now severed. The reason this type of assassination was widely considered plausible is because he embodied the exact ideologies that drove Al Qaeda to it’s activity, but even more deeply it was activity that presented a tangible and direct harm to the people of that population, and in the instance of the United States, it had directly attacked US citizenry. In that case, it becomes logical to suggest that when a leader poses a direct threat to the people of its own nation, then a government is obliged to protect it’s citizens, or another nation is bound by a foreign policy objective to protect that nation when the government is incapable of doing so. In this case, it would prevent most countries from having legal ability to assassinate members or have other countries doing so unless they presented a danger to that population.

But modelling an actual policy of assassination aside, I think there are deeper benefits that can be seen in the advocacy of such policy. In terms of a divergence from the role of diplomacy, assassination prevents the need for arrest of these individuals. Already, any form of trial is redundant because these people are guilty, take pride in being guilty and are too well known for the judge to be objective about their decision, even if there was any semblance of innocence. Moreover, putting them on trial gives them legitimate political and legal forum to spout their ideology. In that case, assassination removes the triviality of a trial and ensures that the situation is resolved more quickly. The fact of over his 100 war crimes, Saddam Hussein was sentenced to death after only three of his charges were heard gives more weight to the fact these people are guilty and a process only postpones the inevitable – and any due process that gives amnesty to these criminals who revel in the spotlight may even offer legitimacy to their ideological and militaristic campaigning. In light of the diplomatic and legal trivialities of ‘due’ process, it becomes apparent that any way to mitigate deaths and the inevitable financial and human burdens of war is legitimate, and because it provides an intermediary step between diplomatic inefficiency and the cost of full scale war, it is the most effective foreign policy and domestic policy tool.

World War One Alliance Systems: As friendly as they appear?

World War One was a perfect cocktail of numerous ingredients that spurred the competing Great Powers of Europe into conflict. The two sides of the Triple Entente and the Central Powers (or Triple Alliance) represented a lot about the war, namely those interests about which the powers were fighting. Indeed from 1870 till Morocco in 1906 and the Great War itself, the alliances were extraordinarily mercurial and flimsy. But surely an alliance system should be stable- diplomacy is about resolution and long-term affiliation. The problem, it seems, is that this wasn’t the goal of the alliance systems at all.

Obviously alliances were forged in the best interests of each nation individually, and not necessarily dominated by a totalising view of a collective benefit, but how is it possible to explain their mercurial nature? At the heart of this is the nature of the formation of the systems themselves. More specifically, I would propose that on the basic of a balance of geopolitics and national interest the individual nations assessed an alliance and entered it. It was without a doubt that imperial rivalry existed, and that attempts to assuage the risk and tension were made through alliances like the Dreikaiserbund. The problem was their interests were incongruent and in events like the Bosnian Annexation Crisis this rivalry nearly manifested in conflict. As a result it forced the empires to re-evaluate their conditions in entering these alliances. Instead of working on either purely geographical, strategic or economical benefit, the powers sacrificed this view to achieve a balance. When Germany was originally part of the Dreikaiserbund, it prevented a two front war; their main aggressor was with France. However, they had demonstrably more aggressive interests that were congruent with Austro-Hungary, but not Russia, hence the dissolution of the League, and eventual conflict in the Bosnian Annexation Crisis. The prevailing systems worked on a balance of political ideology and individual national interest; countries like Britain and Germany could never unite on anything but geographical homogeneity and so they never did. Instead, it was France who relied upon British support in order to assuage the efficacy of a German invasion by controlling the waves, even if Britain presented a much smaller land army than any other power. Moreover, it had an empire that allowed a much more strategic global circumvention, though it was seldom even considered or necessary, for the French.

As a result, the alliances did not achieve the best chemistry between countries, but rather favoured their individual needs in a balance of the typical factors that affected their total national interest. It was events like the one in Bosnia that ultimately provoked the formation of alliances that could withstand geopolitical elements, and balanced this with political ideology and national aspirations. Whatever the perfect chemistry was, it was never achieved because the nations could not survive based on that aspect alone. Therefore, much of the conflict that was a part of World War One was invariably caused by a decision of the powers to invest in more balanced alliance systems that exacerbated imperial rivalries in protection of their own national interests.

Should the media show the full horrors of war?

In Mogadishu in 1993, Somalia was at the precipice, and if it was pushed just enough it would descend into a crisis that could potentially shake millions of lives. A relatively small US task force was involved in trying to take out a warlord whose increasing influence was having massive repercussions on the nature of the civil war, and who was at the heart of many of the tragedies going on in that country. Somalis shot down two Black Hawk helicopter, and damaged three more. The death toll for the Americans was 18, and in the wake of said disaster, a huge outcry emerged to pull troops out of Somalia. The visceral reaction of the American people to the horrors of war that the media beamed across the country was so large that it forced the government to withdraw, and they could no longer prevent the humanitarian crisis that has now developed in Somalia as a result. In this consideration, it possible to downplay the necessity of the media in portraying the full horrors of war as it can create a negative effect on our ability to enter wars, as well as out ability to fight them and our size of involvement.

Similar things happened in Vietnam such that it earned the epithet as the “television war”. The fight to defeat communism and the horrors of war were pitted against each other and eventually the visceral reaction of the public won out again- and it was a war which we technically lost, but one which, in some respects, was a victory such as the abatement of communism throughout the rest of Asia and potentially Australia. Perhaps the Vietnamese regime could also have been defeated, but through media portrayal, particularly of gruesome events like napalm bombing and self-immolating monks, they fomented the natural and fearful reactions of the American and Australian public. It’s not necessarily that we are protecting the people, but a lot of the reason they don’t join the armed forces or engage is in an inherent belief or fear of injury or bodily harm. Through the revelations of the media, the public is exposed to images they are afraid of and they will have a natural visceral reaction to the images they see and this has potential ripples of repercussions- like what happened in Somalia. The exit meant that we had failed to stop the civil war, even slightly and as a result we accentuated the collapse of the situation in Somalia and the subsequent humanitarian crisis. People aren’t necessarily inclined to react with empathy about the situation that they see until it is too late; their initial reaction is generally overridden by a prevailing visceral reaction to the images they see and hear about, and that can exacerbate the issues of the countries or situations that we are trying to mend in the first place.

But I think that the risks of media portrayal go a step further than this and actually inhibit the ability of us to fight wars effectively, particularly in the short term with the development of  a stigma attached to the act of fighting wars. The reality remains that humans are prone to primal reactions of fear and disgust of images they see, but if they become exposed to the graphic images of war, unlike the people who fight it and who are somewhat desensitized and protected against the negative notions of war, then public reaction instigates both a short-term and long term handicap on both military and government in their ability to lead and advocate wars, because they know the accountability of actions becomes exacerbated to perhaps an irrational point and that the actions appear far more grievous and out of context. It is not so much a matter of people needing the images to know the nature of war, they already are exposed to the moral implications of conflict and are able to adjudicate effectively for themselves specifically how bad the war is – they didn’t need images during the World Wars to understand the severe gravity and implications of the fighting were. But when mutilated bodies and burnt carcasses are depicted across the media people build up a resistance to the wars because of a natural reaction, and they refer to this resistance with each conflict and thus inhibit the ability of the governments to enter wars, even those which may be necessary, because of a stigma attached to the fighting.

In that regard, the ability of the media to adequately portray the wars should have restrictions placed on it, otherwise we expose the public to the horrors of war and initiate a visceral reaction that prevents the necessary wars to take place and affect our ability to fight wars as a whole, and further attach a long-term stigma that potentially risks our involvement in necessary conflicts.

How the Rise of Communism contributed to Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War – a long story told short.

“Reds under the beds.” Sounds like a 1950s toy advertisement, doesn’t it? In fact it, pretty much is, excepting the fact that it wasn’t an advertisement for toys, rather, an advertisement slogan against communism.

And so we say, Welcome to the 1950s.

The lustre of a lasting friendship between east and west – communism and democracy – Soviets and Britain/USA- had begun to fade with the memory and feelings of Victory of World War 2. It would become a standoff that almost tipped into Global Nuclear Warfare – such was the fear during the days of the Cold War.

For those in the West- those who were democratic- grave fears for the spread of communism developed, with most notable of the countries that “fell” to communism being China, in 1949. As pockets of pro-communist nations and peoples popped up around Asia, even the best outlooks seemed bleak and grim. These fears culminated in the Korean War which was an attempt, driven by the United Nations, to halt the spread of Communism throughout Asia.

The 38th Parallel – the great divide between North And South Korea- was the result.  South Korea became the shining light of Democracy in Asia, but its influence was so small compared to Communist numbers that it was almost excusable to forget it even existed.

Hardly a success story.

When Communism reached Vietnam – all the alarm bells went off. Now, Australia was at risk of Communism. By that time, fear has already gripped Australia – “Reds Under the Beds” one of the more famous catchphrases of the time. Most emblematic of the panic surrounding Communism, I think, is the Communist Party Dissolution Bill, run through parliament and dismantled by the High Court. The Museum of Australian Democracy website has more on the communist party ban debacle.

As Australia began to grapple with communism within its own borders desperate action was contemplated. The threat of Communism became so frightening that the concept of “Forward Defence” emerged – a way of defending which echoes the saying “the best defence is a good offence.” Australia, if it hoped to evade communism, couldn’t rest on its laurels and try to weather out the storm – it had to go out and beat it. The idea caught on, and at the outbreak of the Vietnam War and Australia’s involvement, there was huge support.

The media flexed its muscle here. Vietnam is often referred to as the “Television War” and the heightened media attention only served to increase support for the war in its early days. In fact, the influence of the media in the Vietnam War stretches back to pre-television times, when the Government spread anti-communist propaganda that developed into widespread approval for most bills and campaigns designed to flush out the threat – including and especially the Vietnam War, which was the longest war of the 20th Century, a way of getting rid of those “Reds under the beds” – a favourite slogan of the media. 

Fixing its first mistake: the Founding of the UN

Founding the United Nations was in itself the first reparation made by the organisation. It had to rectify the mistakes that emerged when the League of Nations failed to counter several global issues effectively. After several problems were encountered by the League, it was up to the allied powers to once again agree during the war to come together and create a new organisation devoted to international peace and cooperation and to help manage some international affairs.

Initially, however, the term had been used for the allied troops, or those allied against Germany, Italy and Japan, and not the organisation that we so fondly know of today. And so in 1941, 26 nations signed a Declaration by the United Nations which set out its aims for the war. In a way, this is really what the United Nations is all about- there was a unity between these nations and a recognition of an evil that they needed to defeat. It was the combined effort that was needed by the League of Nations but was absent in that time.

Although the task took 4 more years to complete, it was a testament to the United Nations’ new found international relations strength, and it was through this victory that the United Nations really came into being.

It was in 1944 that the US, Britain, USSR and China met in Washington to work on the foundations for a new world organisation, which was based largely on its predecessor. It was this meeting that laid the brass tacks for much of the future organisation, although some of the elements of the proposal did not play well with all members. This meeting in Washington was followed by another in Crimea, a year later without a Chinese delegation present.

Here the structure was finalised between the three countries and in the following months a meeting of some 50 nations would come together and produce the United Nations Charter – the Mission Statement of the U.N. Two months after the San Francisco conference which brought about the charter, it was unanimously agreed to and then signed in June of 1945.

It remained roughly built upon the League’s old structure with heads or more powerful nations within the organisation – the United Nations security council, whilst every nation had a voice through the General Assembly. It was a year later, however, that the United Nations truly gained the role of Organisation responsible for international affairs and relations. The League of Nations was dissolved in this year and the United Nations became the only global organisation dedicated to peace and international relations efforts across the world.

It was very early on that Peacekeeping came into the mix of things. Troops from several countries, overseen and headed by the Security Council would become integral in the United Nation’s efforts to promote international peace by preventing conflicts between states and regions in the world. This element of the UN set it apart from the League because it was not afraid to use the coalition of forces to its advantage in order to sustain peace across the world and prevent a third World War.

Moreover, with more countries participating that were present in the League of Nations, there was greater support for the troops and less antagonism towards them. The role of the peacekeepers became officially recognised when they were awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1988.

With this critical element established the United Nations was at the forefront of international relations and peace at a level the League could not have achieved.

Before the United Nations: The League of Nations

Today the organisation at the forefront of international relations and peace is the United Nations. Dozens of countries linked together under a common purpose – the promotion of peace. Some of the founding members attributed one of the major drives towards the founding of this organisation as being a necessary step to averting and avoiding a possible World War 3. It was, however, not the first attempt at some form of global community. In the years preceding World War 2, the big brother of the United Nations took form, but eventually collapsed – The League of Nations.

Following World War 1, both England and France sought revenge for Germany’s actions by imposing heavy war reparation fees, which was only repaid in 2010– nearly 92 years after the War had ended with German defeat and the signing of armistice. During the War, American president Woodrow Wilson had laid out plans for an international body for peace which he hoped would be put to effect in the aftermath of the War – ensuring that it was “the War to end all Wars”.

While France and England disagreed with the American’s view of a lengthy and withstanding peace, the League of Nations was approved in 1919. When Wilson suffered a stroke in the next year, the ratification treaty that was passing through US senate collapsed, and the League of Nations continued onwards without US involvement.

In its early stages, the League worked extraordinarily well – showing the growing global awareness and need for peace such that by December 1920, 48 states had signed the League Covenant (the UN Charter’s counterpart in the League of Nations). They resolved minor issues in the World- small regional tensions, for example. They also helped overlook the transformation of territories that Germany and Turkey had lost into self-governing and functioning states.

Unfortunately, one of the critical differences between the League of Nations and the United Nations was the ability to use force. There was, as BBC History puts it, a great fear by Britain and France to apply force. As the heads of the organisation it was crucial there was some element of unified aggression between them, and the smaller parties of the League of Nations to stop nations in their military advances. This was made clear when Japan advanced into Chinese Manchuria and the League had virtually no effective response – they were afraid of armed retaliation and enforcement.

This became the downfall of the League.

It slowly faded away, and played virtually no part during World War 2. Seemingly inevitably, as it had shown during the Japanese crisis, it could pose no adequate response or force to well and truly “uphold peace and international relations”. In 1946 it was dissolved in favour of the UN – which had a new structure designed to adequately deal with similar situations and respond to growing threats, and most importantly- to not follow the same mistakes as the League of Nations.

And so, a new charter was drawn up and a new organisation was ready to herald in a new age of international relations and global peace- the United Nations.

Bibliography:

1. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2023140,00.html – Time: Why Did World War 1 Just End?: Claire Suddath, Oct 2010, accessed April 21 2011

2. http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/league-of-nations-instituted– History Channel: League of Nations Instituted, accessed 21 April 2011

3. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/league_nations_01.shtml– BBC History: The League of Nations and the United Nations, Charles Townshend, Feb 2011, accessed 22 April 2011

Afghanistan: Vietnam’s cousin

In the wake of the conclusion of World War 2, Communism began a rapid rise throughout Asian populations. Eastern Europe, now under Soviet Control, was largely Communist, so whilst the Western side of Europe (that is, West of the Berlin Wall) was Democratic. Communism, instead of spreading through the West of Europe began to spread South of Soviet Russia, beginning with one of the most important countries in Asia – China.

In 1949, China became Communist, and although parts of Chinese Communism differed from the Soviet Style, they were largely the same, and now the most populous country was Communist. They also had a claim to one of the two superpowers of the day, Soviet Russia being one, and the United States being the other.

Other countries also ‘fall’. North Korea becomes aligned with China and Soviet Russia, whilst the South remains democratic, sparking a civil war which later attracts the United States, China, and Russia into conflict.

Vietnam also becomes Communist later, as I explained in my previous post, and in some cases, Vietnam bears similarities to the Korean War.

In many ways , Afghanistan also parallels Vietnam- showing that over the span of 50-odd years, war scarcely changes. But first the clash of Communism and Democracy – a key similarity between Vietnam and Korea .

Interestingly, as I discussed in my previous post, both conflicts involved a Communist North combating a Democratic South, and in both conflicts, the North were supported by the Chinese and the South by the Americans (who, in Korea, acted on behalf of the UN with several other countries, providing nearly half of all the troops representing South Korea)

This could serve to highlight the spread of Communism from North to South – what I mean is, Soviet Russia, the northern most country spreads Communism south, through China, Korea and Vietnam. In the latter two of those examples, the South was democratic (Although South Vietnam tended to be a bit more of a “technically Democratic” than actually Democratic due to the fact there was corruption and often a misuse of power) and the North Communist, showing the spread of Communism as it worked its way through Asia- the “Domino Theory”, as it was called.

The proximity of the conflicts in terms of time shows that the spread of Communism was also quite rapid in its movement through Asia, despite the fact that the spread was, in a way, slowed down at the conclusion of the Korean War with armistice being signed with both the North and South claiming part of the Korean Peninsula in a Communist-Democratic divide.

Our modern day conflict- the War on Terror in the Middle East  and Afghanistan – also mirrors in some ways the conflict in Vietnam. In his book The War Within, Bob Woodward (link to Amazon.com)mentions several times how we still make some of the same mistakes we did in Vietnam, for example it was believed that in Vietnam the number of Vietcong killed was a measure of progress towards victory, when in reality, it often does not in modern day conflicts. Some higher powers however, continue to do so in Vietnam and Bob Woodward writes that even the president at the time – George W. Bush – measured progress in the same way:

“The President’s persistent questions suggested… believed in an attrition strategy of simply eliminating the bad guys. The Vietnam War had established that wouldn’t work… It was pure body count, one more echo of Vietnam”

This belief of ‘who kills more wins’ has elements of truth, but dozens of other factors have to be taken into account if there is to be a measure of progress towards victory. Of course killing the enemy helps stop them, but there is a noticeable fact that if the enemy are taking the territory, then the enemy is winning the war. The loss of numbers are a side effect of victory, and sometimes its been proven that those who risk the most lives gain the victory. The Soviet army in World War 2 was a prime example of how, in the end, the loss of troops in astounding numbers could not stop the advance of the Soviet army, eventually resulting in its push through to Berlin from the East, and the downfall of the Nazis in Germany.

Even if we were to take into account the large Soviet population of the time, one of the largest in the world, a large percentage of the population was affected, larger than other countries suffered during the war. Number of casualties are not a measure of progress, it is only one indicator of success. When generals and leaders used the body count as a measure of progress in Afghanistan, one of the mistakes of Vietnam was repeated and while many military improvements have occurred, a significant factor has, according to Bob and some other military experts in the book, been overlooked.

In entering Iraq and Afghanistan, many of the lessons of Vietnam were taken into account– as was revealed at the UK inquiry into the war – though, as Bob Woodward writes, apparently some of the fundamental lessons were overlooked.

And that’s what this whole article is about. How on the surface, there may be changes to technology or tactics – but fundamentally, war is the same, despite the change of time. It is always a clash of territory – of possession. Many factors are different between Vietnam and the Middle East, for example, environmentally, the tropics of Vietnam differ from the dry deserts of Afghanistan and the Middle East. But essentially – the goals remain alarmingly similar.

So does war.

It was to Vietnam we marched when we believed that democracy would collapse in Asia – we went to preserve and defend it. In the Middle East we sought to build and preserve it.

War may stay the same, but attitudes surrounding it grow different over time. The rise of the idea that peace is more essential in recent years culminated in organisations like the UN. How do we establish and maintain global peace and avert World War 3 from ever happening?

So I too, will move from war to peace – and the next article will surround the UN and its conception and history.

References:

Korean War-

Australian War Memorial, Korean War info, published on/by Australian War Memorial, available from http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/korea.asp (accessed 11th April 2011)

Details on President’s view of Afghanistan progress, Bob Woodward “The War Within”

Bob Woodward (First Edition Hardback)(2008) White House during the war on Terror. NY, New York published by Simon and Schuster.

“The War Within” (2008) quote from pages 6-7 (accessed 12th April 2011)

UK inquiry into the war

BBC World News (February 2010) Iraq War Inquiry: How Vietnam influenced planning of War, published BBC News, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8495044.stm , (accessed 14th April 2011)

Vietnam : How the country split, and fell into war.

One of the longest wars in modern conflicts, the Vietnam War defined the clash between the Democratic Western World and Communism. The Democratic south collided with the Communist north, a conflict which mirrored the recent Korean War. In fact, numerous parallels can be drawn between the two conflicts- both had North Communist ‘nations’ supported by the newly Communist China and Soviet Republic, whilst the South Democratic nations were supported by the US.

The fear of communism, exemplified by the proposed “Domino Theory”, was as much a part of the decision to enter both these conflicts as the imposing threat of unlawful invasion by the North. Under the Domino Theory, it was thought that as a result of China “falling” to Communism, Vietnam could follow suit. And if that happened, the rest of South East Asia, and possibly Australia, were at risk of Communism taking control as well.

As it were, Communism had developed in Vietnam in a way which split the country – and set the scene for a conflict. Before the War, Vietnam and the rest of Indochina were unified under French colonial rule – a result of the collapse of the Japanese empire at the conclusion of World War 2. In response, the locals in Vietnam either embraced or rejected the French.

Those who rejected were led by Ho Chi Minh, a leader who tried to spread the ideas of Communism. His forces began to oppose French rule in an attempt to replace the French with a communist government.  His liberation movement, or ‘National Liberation Front’, as it came to be known (later the Vietcong), fought against the French through guerrilla warfare, beginning an independence war which culminated in the final battle at Dien Bien Phu – where the French were defeated.

This victory would be costly for those who supported Democracy in Vietnam – to the people, it looked as if the Communists had rescued them from tyrannical  French rulers.

In their eyes, the Communists were the good ones.

During the same time period, a conference was held at Geneva, with China, USSR, Australia and the United States all observers to the talks being held. The Geneva Conference was used to diplomatically solve the crisis in Indochina, where the country was split into two – North and South; Communist and Democratic. The idea was that by dividing the country, the population could make the decision as to which side they preferred and, at a later time (2 years later, in 1956), vote as to whether or not they wished the country to remain split, or whether it should recombine as Vietnam again – to be one whole state governed by either government.

The time for the elections came and went, as the South refused to participate – and they were backed by the US.

The North were infuriated. So to, were China. The Vietcong and the North were almost guaranteed unification under the Communist Government – the people had supported them from their victory at Dien Bien Phu.  This ‘ betrayal’ to the convention stopped them gaining control of all of Vietnam.

And in the typically militaristic nature of Communism there seemed only one option – invasion of the South.

The US couldn’t let the South fall – it needed democracy to be upheld, particularly if it wanted to prevent the Domino Theory becoming reality, and perhaps even reaching Australia. This guaranteed both Australian and US involvement to some extent, and so the US enter Vietnam to aid the South, and China, in an attempt to spread communism, along with the Soviets, aided the North. China’s influence was much stronger as both an Asian nation, and also because of the proximity to Vietnam, so the Soviet involvement was relatively small, but sizeable enough to cause some distress.

The clash between North and South – Communism and Democracy began.

And so, we have the Vietnam War.

 

 

References:

Domino Theory-

Hal Colebatch (May 2009) The Domino Theory, published on/by The Australian Newspaper, available from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/domino-theory-for-the-age-of-terror/story-e6frg6ux-1225713257155 (accessed 5th April 2011)

French Colonisation, Geneva Conference details

Stephen Kirchhoff (November 2003) Dien Bien Phu and colonisation, published through Campbell University, available from http://web.campbell.edu/faculty/Slattery/dien_bien_phu.htm (accessed 5th April 2011)

Battle of Dien Bien Phu

Time Magazine (May 1954) Battle of Dien Bien Phu, published on Time Magazine, available from http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,860710,00.html, (accessed 5 April 2011)